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Abstract
The system of active labor market policies (ALMP) in the Slovak Republic consists to a
large extent of the creation of socially purposeful and publicly useful jobs and of
retraining of unemployed workers. So far, the effects of these types of active labor market
policies have hardly been analyzed. This paper uses a unique administrative data from 20
Slovak districts to analyze to what extent it is beneficial for unemployed workers who want
a regular job to accept a temporary ALMP-job or enter a retraining program. We find
that indeed it is beneficial for workers to do so.
JEL classification numbers: J64, C41    
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The Slovak labor market ranks among the transitional labor markets of Central and Eastern
Europe. It shares many features of these labor markets, but at the same time, it has specific
features on its own. Typical common features are represented, for example, by the sharp
initial increase of unemployment rate, the accommodation of excessive labor force by
massive retirement of older workers and by the introduction of early retirement, the first
tightening reforms of unemployment insurance systems, subsequent fluctuations within a
trap of two-digit unemployment rate levels, the high share of long-term unemployed and
relatively low outflows to jobs.
Among the specific Slovak features we name the frequent reforms of both the
unemployment insurance system and the system of active labor market policies. Sometimes
decision-makers took short-sighted options and subordinated labor market policies to
budgetary considerations. Frequent institutional reforms provide grounds for examining the
effects of these changes on the individual behavior at the labor market. This aspect of the
Slovak labor market is used also in this paper.2
Like many other countries with a transitional economy, Slovakia underwent a sharp
increase of unemployment at the initial stage of the transition. In the course of 1991,
unemployment increased from practically zero to 300,000 persons which corresponded to
an unemployment rate of about 12 % (OECD 1996). Since then the authorities have been
fighting with double-digit unemployment rates that did not decline, as was originally hoped,
at the later stages of the transition when the restructuring of the economy should have been
completed to a large extent. During the seven years of transition, the unemployment rate
has been fluctuating between 12 and 15%. At the end of the first quarter of 1998 the
unemployment rate was about 12 %.
Slovak authorities have been very active in the field of institutional labor market reforms.
The passive labor market policy underwent major reforms more often than in the other
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) countries. Unique was, for example, the loosening
reform of unemployment insurance benefits in 1995 followed by some more relaxing steps.
In 1997 the system was re-built again. Despite the fact that the aggregate level of
unemployment proved to be slightly responsive to the unemployment insurance reforms
(mostly after the tightening reform of 1992), the existing empirical research at the micro-
level did not prove any substantial effects of passive policies on the individual duration of
unemployment.
Ham, Svejnar and Terrell (1996) analyze micro data to investigate the incentive effects of
the unemployment compensation system of Czecho-Slovakia before the split-up of the two
countries in 1993. They find that unemployment benefits have a moderate to small effect on
the duration of unemployment. Furthermore, they find that older workers, low educated
workers, gypsies and handicapped have longer unemployment durations than other
workers. Lubyova and Van Ours (1997) examine the effects of unemployment insurance
(UI) reforms on the exit rates from unemployment. They find that the tightening and
loosening reforms of unemployment insurance did not influence individual re-employment
probabilities very much. Instead, the alternative exit state - out of labor force – seems to be
more sensitive to the changes. Lubyova and Van Ours (1998a) investigate the possible
disincentive effects on exits from unemployment provided by unemployment insurance and
social assistance benefits. Although there were certain groups of unemployed identified for
                                      
2 Another specific feature of Slovakia is its common past with the Czech Republic, due to which
Slovakia is considered to be a useful reference point in investigating the puzzle of the extremely low
Czech unemployment rate.
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whom the potential labor income was comparable to the income from social assistance, the
hazard function analysis based on micro-data from the Slovak LFS did not prove any
disincentive effects. However, as the nature of LFS data did not allow an accurate
measurement of the true individual replacement ratios, some proxies for the amount of
social assistance received were used. From an additional analysis of LFS-data in which they
distinguish between job losers and school-leavers, Lubyova and Van Ours (1998b)
conclude that young, male, highly educated job losers and job losers living in low
unemployment districts have higher exit rates to a job than their counterparts have. For
unemployed school leavers the exit out of unemployment seems to be more or less a
random process. Another main conclusion is that there are indications of a severe sort of
unobserved heterogeneity among job losers. According to the estimates 85% of the Slovak
job losers has a low job finding rate.
Simultaneously with the use of passive labor market programs the Slovak authorities
implemented active labor market policies (ALMP) extensively. ALMP were introduced in
1991 and gradually developed into a comprehensive system of more than 8 basic types of
programs. The last major reorganization occurred in 1997.
So far, not a lot of research has been done on the effects of the Slovak active labor market
policies. The existing research is focused on the effects of ALMP spending on the overall
outflow from unemployment. Burda and Lubyova (1995) examined the effectiveness of
ALMP expenditures in the Czech and Slovak Republics. They find that the elasticities of
unemployment outflow with respect to ALMP expenditures are positive and statistically
significant, with the Slovak one being slightly higher than the Czech one. This result is
confirmed by Boeri (1997a) who concludes that ALMP seem to have had an impact on
outflows to jobs in most transition economies. In a recent study on the Polish labor market
Puhani (1998) concludes that training increases re-employment chances of unemployed
while subsidized jobs have a negative employment effect. According to Puhani the effects
of Polish ALMP are larger in absolute size for men than for women. From an overview of
studies on labor-market reforms in transition economics Boeri (1997b) concludes that
active policies, such as subsidized employment schemes and public work programs have not
been very successful. According to Boeri this may have to do with the phenomenon that
slots in training courses are often offered to job seekers with rather favorable labor market
characteristics who would have found a job anyway. Furthermore, participation in active
labor market policy programs may stigmatize the participants, which will reduce their
chances of finding a regular job.
The main purpose of this paper is to study the effects of active labor market policy
programs in Slovakia more closely. We use the exit rate from unemployment to regular jobs
as an indicator for the successfulness of these programs. We do not investigate the quality
of the match between the worker and the job, nor do we investigate the length of new job
spell. We use a sample of 20 Slovak districts of which we have very detailed labor market
information with respect to the workers that started unemployment spell in 1993. We do
separate analyses for males and females.
The paper is set up as follows. In section 2 we provide stylized facts about recent
developments in Slovak unemployment and the system of active labor market policies. In
section 3 we describe our data and the sampling procedure. In section 4 we discuss our
statistical model and in section 5 our estimation results. Section 6 concludes.
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2.  UNEMPLOYMENT AND ACTIVE LABOR MARKET POLICIES
In the current paper we try to measure at the individual level the effects of subsidized job
creation programs on exits from unemployment. The programs examined by us, known as
socially purposeful jobs (SPJ) and publicly useful jobs (PUJ) form the major part of ALMP
programs in Slovakia. We also consider retraining as an ALMP program.
ALMP were introduced in 1991 and gradually developed into a comprehensive system of
more than 8 basic types of programs. The last major re-organization occurred in 1997.
Until the end of 1996 the ALMP in Slovakia contained the following measures: socially
purposeful jobs (SPJ), publicly useful jobs (PUJ), retraining, counseling, sheltered
workplaces for the disabled, subsidies for shortened working hours and places for school-
leavers. SPJ were the most important throughout the period, both in terms of number of
created jobs and expenditures. They were followed by PUJ and retraining.
The Socially Purposeful Jobs program has been the most extensive one among Slovak
ALMP programs both in terms of expenditures and participants. SPJ are subsidized jobs in
the private sector. The concept of SPJ and the rules of administration have undergone
numerous revisions as the authorities learned how to tailor the programs to labor market
conditions. Back in March 1991 SPJ were considered to be every job created on the basis
of an agreement with the labor office by an employer in production, business or other
activities aimed at profit. In 1992 the profit-seeking requirement was eliminated and the
requirement that the job had to be occupied by registered unemployed was introduced. The
latter was partially relaxed in 1994 when the school-leavers, persons younger than 18 years
and those who would be full-time self-employed under SPJ were allowed to participate
without prior registration. The main forms of support introduced in 1991 were subsidies,
interest repayments and loans, later reduced to 2-years loans and subsidies. The minimum
duration of SPJ was introduced in 1992 and set to 2-years period. In case of lay-off or quit,
the job should be occupied by another registered unemployed within 30 days. Stocks of SPJ
were built up in the course of 1992 and stabilized afterwards. Generous spending before the
end of 1992 resulted in a major inflow of almost 25 000 jobs. Another large inflow of about
half that size occurred at the end of 1994.
Publicly useful jobs are public works (community works) designed mostly for lower
qualified workers for a limited period of time. In 1991 PUJ were introduced as short-term
employment opportunities created on the basis of agreement with labor office by an
employer who is not in production, business or other activities aimed at profit (for example,
organs of state administration, municipalities, local administration). The requirement for
non-profit orientation of the employer was canceled in 1992. State budgetary organizations
and state contributory (partial budgetary) organizations were excluded from PUJ programs
in 1994. The upper limit for financial support was originally set at the wage costs of the
participant, later extended to cover also participant's social insurance contributions. The
maximum duration of  PUJ in 1991 was 6 months. Given that the participation renewed
unemployment benefit entitlement, many unemployed were shifting between PUJ and open
unemployment. Therefore, the maximum duration of PUJ was raised to 9 months in 1994
and to 12 months in 1995. Stocks of jobs and participants in the  program have reached
merely one sixth of those of SPJ. The stocks were strongly built up after two major inflows
of about the same size, which occurred in the financing boom of 1992 (together with the
major SPJ inflow), and in the first half of 1995. The latter inflow was a result of changed
priorities in 1995 - more means were put into PUJ, partly at the expense of other programs.
Because of the limited duration of PUJ the stocks were not as stable as in the case of SPJ.
After the large inflows the stocks were gradually depleted.
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Retraining has been used relatively modestly. The share of total ALMP expenditures
dedicated to retraining has been less than 10 % and it has a declining tendency. Where
possible, retraining of employees in enterprises is preferred to retraining of unemployed by
labor offices. The average share of unemployed in the total number of retrained persons 
was typically 60 to 70 %, the share of retrained persons in the total number of unemployed
was typically less than 5 %. According to a survey organized at district labor offices by
Duffner (1994), the average duration of a retraining course was 8 weeks, the overall range
spanning 4 to 19 weeks. The rate of subsequent job-placement was, on average, 63 %, the
range among districts reached from 35 to 85 %. This may be due to the ex-ante promise of
job-placement required by many labor offices in the light of severe shortage of available
vacancies.
In 1997 the structure of ALMP programs was substantially reformed. A new act on
employment, effective since January 1997, stipulated the following ALMP measures:
retraining, support of job creation,  support of employment of specific target groups,
support for prevention of layoffs, support for maintenance of existing jobs, support for
elaborating proposals for revitalization of employment, support for employment of disabled.
From the comparison of the two structures it is obvious that more attention is currently
being paid to the measures of a preventive nature, as well as to targeting of the measures to
specific groups (disabled, older people, long-term unemployed, young workers and school
leavers). The original job creation programs (SPJ and PUJ) were formally unified into one
program of job creation, although the distinction between the two types of jobs was
preserved. SPJ were further diversified and targeted on specific groups of unemployed (SPJ
in general, self-employment, jobs for school-leavers, special targeted program for long-term
unemployed, persons older than 50 years, parents after prolonged maternity leave, and
those to be laid-off for organizational reasons).
3.  DATA
The data used in our analysis come from the unemployment registers of labor offices in 20
selected Slovak districts. Until the end of 1996, there were 38 districts in Slovakia. The
administrative reform of 1997 increased the number of districts to 76. In our analysis we
use data from 20 districts, which cover 33 % of total Slovak area and 38 % of the total
population.3 The selection of districts was made in order to cover all Slovak regions (see
Figure 1). The sample contains both industrial centers and agricultural districts in the
country. Characteristics of the selected districts are summarized in Table 1. Table 2
summarizes the numbers of created SPJ and PUJ in the sampled districts as compared to
the Slovak totals. In the selected districts the data collection was exhaustive, i.e. all the
registered unemployed were selected.4
<< Figure 1 about here >>
<< Table 1 about here >>
<< Table 2 about there >>
We use several types of information in order to reconstruct individual histories. An
individual history consists of a sequence of spells representing three possible labor market
                                      
3 With one exception (Pezinok) these districts also existed before 1997.
4 Our sampling procedure corresponds to a one-stage cluster sampling.
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states: employment, unemployment and out of labor force. In addition to that, we are able
to identify the spells of participation in SPJ and PUJ programs.
The information about the last unemployment spell comes directly from the unemployment
register, which contains also information about the personal characteristics of job
applicants. Due to the overwriting of records in case of repeated registration, the
unemployment register does not contain information on previous unemployment history.
Therefore, we had to turn to unemployment archives in order to reconstruct the
information on previous unemployment spells.
In addition to the unemployment information, we used separate files containing information
about previous employment or OLF spells prior to every registration. Finally, we used
information about dates and duration of SPJ and PUJ spells.
From the unemployment register and unemployment archives we selected an inflow sample
of all the unemployed that became registered in the course of 1993. The censoring point for
our sample was April 1998. By combining the four sources of information (unemployment
register, unemployment archives, information on previous employment or OLF, and
information on ALMP), we were able to obtain individual histories starting elsewhere in the
past and ending at the above-mentioned censoring date. The use of 1993 inflow is justified
by the relative stability in the institutional set-up of the labor market (major reforms
occurred at the beginning of 1992 and 1995). Another reason was a sufficient time period
elapsed before the censoring point in order to avoid large shares of censored spells.5
We obtained a sample of about 100,000 individuals who were in the 1993-unemployment
inflow. We traced all other spells of these individuals. We sorted the spells chronologically
in ascending order of their beginning and ending dates. In this way we obtained individual
histories, typically beginning by the previous employment or OLF spell(s) prior to the first
registration in unemployment register. Employment spells are by far the longest, mostly due
to the long reported employment spells starting before 1989.
In our analysis we use information about the length of the first spell of unemployment that
started in 1993 and if this spell ended about the labor market status after unemployment. If
the spell ended in a transition to a job the unemployment spell was considered to be
completed. If the spell ended in a transition to an ALMP-job or to training the
unemployment duration was considered to be continued until another transition occurred
either to a job or back to unemployment. When a transition to a job happened the
unemployment spell was considered to be complete. When a transition occurred back to
unemployment the spell was still considered to be incomplete. In the analysis we also
considered the duration of unemployment up to a transition to an ALMP-job or to training
to be important. This duration is the search period until an active labor market policy
measure is met. If the spell did not end or ended in a transition to out of the labor force the
unemployment spell is considered to be right censored. The sample characteristics for the
1993 unemployment inflow in the 20 sampled districts are presented in Appendix 2.
4.  STATISTICAL MODEL
                                      
5 In our previous research based on individual data from the Slovak unemployment register there
was a trade-off between censoring and overwriting: the longer the time period observed, the smaller
the share of censored spells was in the sample. At the same time, an increasing proportion of
information was lost due to the overwriting of older spells by newer ones in case of repeated
registration. In our current sample we eliminated the overwriting problem by using the archived
information.
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In order to establish the effect of ALMP-jobs and retraining on the exit rate from
unemployment to a regular job we have to set-up a model that accounts for possible
selectivity in the inflow into the programs of active labor market policy. In our model we
exploit information with respect to the duration of unemployment, the duration of the stay
in an ALMP-program and the destinations after that (see Lancaster (1990) for an overview
of methods of duration analysis).
From an econometric point of view the problem we analyze is similar to that in Holm, Van
den Berg and Van Ours (1998). In this paper an analysis is presented of a part of the Dutch
medical system. In the Netherlands, to become a medical doctor, students with an
undergraduate medical degree have to apply for a trainee position. While searching for a
trainee position they may accept a temporary job as a medical assistant. The paper by
Holm, Van den Berg and Van Ours (1998) uses a micro data set to investigate whether
accepting such a temporary job speeds up the process of finding a trainee position. A major
problem is the possible endogeneity of the temporary job, since the enrollment into such a
job may be selective. To account for possible selectivity, they simultaneously model the
transitions from unemployment to medical trainee, from unemployment to medical
assistant, from medical assistant to medical trainee and from medical assistant to
unemployment. By allowing for correlation between unobserved heterogeneity in the
various transition rates they account for possible selectivity, which indeed turns out to be
important. Overall, they find that a job as medical assistant is improving the speed by which
medical undergraduates find a trainee position.
Other examples of the use of similar multivariate duration models are Abbring, Van den
Berg and Van Ours (1997) and Van den Berg, Van der Klaauw and Van Ours (1998). In
these studies the effect of benefit sanctions on the transition rate from unemployment to
employment is modeled. Here too, the issue of selectivity is very important. Again,
selectivity is accounted for by modeling both the exit rates out of unemployment and the
rate by which unemployed get a sanction imposed and investigate the correlation between
the unobserved heterogeneity terms. Both studies find a significant positive effect of benefit
sanctions on the transition rate from unemployment to a job. In the study by Van den Berg,
Van der Klaauw and Van Ours (1998) it is shown that if unobserved heterogeneity is not
accounted for, no effect of sanctions is found.
In the multivariate duration models the variation in the durations at which treatment is
administered to individuals, and data on the corresponding pre- and post-treatment
durations can be exploited to identify the treatment effect. A formal proof of this is given in
Abbring and Van den Berg (1998).
We use the same method of analysis as in the studies just mentioned. Our starting point is
Model 1, a proportional hazard model with a flexible baseline hazard. Differences between
unemployed individuals in the transition rate from unemployment to a job can be
characterized by the observed characteristics x, the elapsed duration of unemployment
itself, and a variable indicating whether or not the individual started participating in an
ALMP-program. For the moment we do not distinguish between different programs, so an
ALMP-program is either a PUJ, a SPJ or retraining. We assume x to be time-invariant. If ta
is the time at which the individual starts participating in an ALMP-program and I(ta<t) is
the dummy variable indicating whether the individual has already started participating, the
transition rate from unemployment to a job at time t conditional on x and ta can be specified
as follows:
θj(t; x) = λj (t).exp(x’βj + δ.I(ta<t)) (1)
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where λj (t) represent individual duration dependence and  δ measures the effect that
participation in an ALMP-program has on the transition rate from unemployment to a
regular job. We model flexible duration dependence by using a step function
λj (t) = exp(Σk( λj,k Ik(t)) (2)
where k (= 1,..,4) is a subscript for time-intervals and Ik(t) are time-varying dummy
variables that are one in subsequent time-intervals. We distinguish four time intervals: 1-2
quarters, 3-4 quarters, 4-8 quarters and 8+ quarters. Because we also estimate a constant
term, we normalize λj,1=0.
The basic assumption in Model 1 is that the inflow into the ALMP-program is a random
process in the sense that it is independent of the process by which unemployed find jobs.
The selection into the treatment-program is exogenous and does not depend on unobserved
characteristics that also affect the job finding rate. In other words, conditional on observed
characteristics and the duration of unemployment the quality of the unemployed flowing
into ALMP is as good (or as bad) as the quality of the unemployed that remain
unemployed. Then, if we measure an effect of an ALMP-program (δ ≠ 0), this is a ‘true’
effect. This effect could go both ways. If  δ < 0 the ALMP-program has a negative effect
on the re-employment hazard, which could be caused by stigmatization. If  δ > 0 the
ALMP-participants have a higher exit rate to a job than the non-participants. Note that in
the specification of the hazard in equation (1) the effect of an ALMP-program occurs
immediately. Later on we relax this assumption. Also note that we consider the duration of
a stay in an ALMP-program as an extended unemployment duration. Our concept does not
coincide with the official statistics but we take the point of view of labor economists: a
person is unemployed until he or she finds a job or leaves the labor market.
The density of completed unemployment durations is simply:
ƒj (t) = θj(t; x) exp( 0∫ t θj(s; x) ds) (3)
In a similar way we model the transition rate to an ALMP-program at time t conditional on
observed characteristics x as:
θa(t; x) = λa (t).exp(x’βa) (4)
where λa (t) = exp(Σk( λa,k Ik(t)) and the normalization is λa,1=0. The density of completed
duration of ‘search’ for an ALMP-program is equal to:
ƒa (t) = θa(t; x) exp( 0∫ t θa(s; x) ds) (5)
Then, the log-likelihood of Model 1 is specified as:
‹ = d1.∑ log(ƒj.(1-Fa)) +  d2.∑ log(ƒj.ƒa ) + d3.∑ log(1-Fj).ƒa + d4 ∑ log(1-Fj)(1-Fa) (6)
where d1 is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if the unemployed did not participate in an
ALMP-program but still found a job, d2 is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if the
unemployed participated in an ALMP-program and then found a job,  d3 is a dummy
variable with a value of 1 if the unemployed participated in an ALMP-program but did not
find a job and d4 is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if the unemployed neither
9
participated in an ALMP-program nor found a job. Note that we could have estimated the
parameters of both hazard rates separately since the likelihood factorises.
In Model 2 we allow for unobserved heterogeneity to affect the transitions to both a job
and to ALMP-programs:
θj(t; x, u) = λj (t).exp(x’βj + δ.I(ta) + u)
θa(t; x, v) = λa (t).exp(x’βa + v) (7)
where u and v are the components of unobserved heterogeneity in the transition rates to a
regular job and to an ALMP-program. Now we can allow for selectivity in the inflow into
an ALMP-program. If the unobserved characteristics have a negative effect on the job
finding rate and a positive effect on the transition rate to an ALMP-program, then
conditional on the observed characteristics and the elapsed duration of unemployment the
average quality of the workers in an ALMP-program is lower than the average quality of
workers who do not enter an ALMP-program. Then, if we would simply compare the
transition rates to regular jobs of both groups we would compare workers with unfavorable
characteristics and ALMP-participation with workers with more favorable characteristics
and non-ALMP-participation. Therefore, we would underestimate the true effect of
participating in an ALMP-program. The opposite effect is also possible. One could imagine
that the people in control of the ALMP-programs want their programs to be a success.
Therefore they prefer workers with good characteristics to flow into their program. This
would imply that there is a positive correlation between the unobserved heterogeneity
components in both transition rate. Then, we would overestimate the effect of ALMP-
programs.
We define G(u,v) to be the joint distribution of the unobserved characteristics u,v. Then,
the joint density function of tj, ta conditional on x equals
ƒj,a (tj, ta| x) = ∫u  ∫v  ƒj (tj | x, u, ta) ƒa (ta| x, v) dG(u,v) (8)
We assume G to be a discrete distribution of unobserved heterogeneity with two points of
support (ua, va), (ub, vb). The associated probabilities are denoted as follows:
Pr(u = ua, v=va) = p Pr(u = ub, v=vb) = 1-p (9)
where 0≤p≤1. We modeled p = exp(α)/(1+exp(α)) to have a logit specification. The set-up
of the likelihood is similar to the one presented in equation (6). However, because of the
introduction of unobserved heterogeneity it is not possible to factorise the likelihood.
                       
5.  ESTIMATION RESULTS
5.1 Parameter estimates
10
We use data from 20 Slovak districts whose labor market characteristics are described in
Tables 1 and 2. Of all the workers that started an unemployment spell in these districts in
1993 we have information with respect to the length of the spell, the destination after the
spell, the length of the subsequent spell, et cetera. On the basis of this information we
estimate the coefficients of the models presented in the previous section using the method
of maximum likelihood. We do separate analyses for males and females.
The explanatory variables we use refer to age, education, marital status, ethnic group and
district unemployment rate. (See Appendix 1 for a definition of the variables). We have a
data set of about 100,000 individuals from which in order to reduce the computational
burden we took a 10% random sample. After omitting individuals of which we lack
information with respect to relevant variables, samples of 6651 males and 4970 females
remain. Appendix 2 presents descriptive statistics for both samples. It turns out that males
and females have a similar age distribution. About 35-40% of the workers is younger than
30 years. Furthermore, of the males 50% has a lower education and 30% has a secondary
or higher education. On average the females are higher educated since 43% of them has
secondary or higher education. About 50% of the male unemployed workers are married,
while of the female unemployed workers about 65% are married. With respect to
nationality both samples only differ slightly. About 4% of the unemployed are classified as
Gypsy, and about 4% as Hungarian. Note however, that with respect to nationality there
are big differences between the districts. Finally there is information about the way the
unemployment spells ended. Of the males in our sample 47% ended unemployment by
finding a job, while of 45% the unemployment spell was right censored. The remaining 8%
of the males ended up in an ALMP-program. Of the females 40% found a job and 9%
entered an ALMP-program. Of the remaining 51% of female unemployed workers the
unemployment spell was right censored.
We estimate the parameters of models 1 and 2 using maximum likelihood. Table 3 presents
the estimation results. As indicated in Section 4 we distinguish between two model
specifications. Model 1 does not allow for possible unobserved heterogeneity in either of
the transition rates. Differences between the two exit rates are due to differences in
coefficients of observed characteristics of individuals. This implies that the inflow into
ALMP-programs is assumed to be exogenous with respect to the direct flow from
unemployment to a regular job. In Model 2 we introduce unobserved heterogeneity in both
transition rates and we investigate whether there is correlation between the unobserved
heterogeneity terms. If there is, then there is selectivity in the inflow into ALMP-programs.
First we extensively discuss the estimation results for males, then we briefly discuss the
estimation results for females focusing on differences with males.
<< Table 3 about here>>
For males it appears that unobserved heterogeneity is present. There are two groups of
workers that differ both in terms of the transition rate to a job and in terms of the transition
rate to an ALMP-program. We only know that they differ but we do not know the reason
why. If we compare the estimation results of Models 1 and 2 we see that they improve
substantially if unobserved heterogeneity is introduced. The two mass points of the
unobserved heterogeneity distribution of the transition rate to a regular job are quite far
apart, as are those of the transition rate to an ALMP-program. One group of about 10% of
the workers has a very low transition rate to a regular job and a high transition rate to
ALMP-programs. The other group of about 90% has a higher transition rate to a regular
job and a substantially lower transition rate to an ALMP-program. Apparently, the
selectivity of the inflow into an ALMP-program is very important.
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Because of the perfect negative correlation of the unobserved heterogeneity terms it is easy
to explain why we find a negative treatment effect in Model 1. Since in this model we
assume that there is no selectivity we find that workers experience a decrease in their exit
rate to a regular job once they enter an ALMP-program. In fact conditional on observed
characteristics and the elapsed duration of unemployment workers that enter an ALMP-
program have worse labor market characteristics than workers have that do not enter an
ALMP-program. So, it is the selectivity that is responsible for the apparent negative
treatment effect. In fact in Model 2 we find that the treatment effect is positive. So for
unemployed workers entering an ALMP-program is beneficial. As soon as they have
entered the ALMP-program their transition rate to a regular job increases with 150%.
With respect to a regular job, for males age is relevant since workers younger than 30 years
have an exit rate to a job that is higher than that of their older colleagues. A somewhat
surprising result is that unemployed workers with incomplete secondary education have a
larger exit rate to a regular job than workers with either lower or higher education. It may
be because vocational education, including lower vocational, is included in secondary. The
fact that workers with vocational education have low re-employment probabilities in
transition countries has been widely documented. Marital status also has a positive effect on
the exit rate to a regular job. Furthermore, we find that both Gypsies and Hungarians have a
smaller exit rate to a regular job. Finally, the unemployment rate has a negative effect. In
districts with high unemployment rates the individual exit rates to a job are smaller than
they are in districts with low unemployment rates. Duration dependence in the exit rate to a
regular job is not very important since this rate stays sort of constant after 6 months of
unemployment.
With respect to ALMP-programs the age of male workers is not important. Education is
important. Males with secondary and higher education have a higher exit rate to ALMP-
programs than males with a lower education have. Married males, Gypsies and Hungarians
have similar exit rates to ALMP-programs than their counterparts, non-married males and
Slovaks. Finally the unemployment rate has a positive effect. In districts with high
unemployment rates the individual transition rates into ALMP-programs are larger than
they are in districts with low unemployment rates. The transition rate to ALMP-programs
increases over the duration of unemployment. The transition rate in the second half of the
first year of unemployment is significantly higher than the transition rate in the first six
months. In the second year there is again an increase in this transition rate.
Comparing the estimation results for the coefficients of the two transition rates it is striking
that the signs are very similar. Lower educated and older unemployed are worse off for
every exit state. So, the surprising result is that in terms of the observed characteristics of
unemployed workers the ALMP-programs do not balance the effect of the ordinary labor
market, but they seem to strengthen these effects. Those workers who have a better
position when it comes to finding regular jobs are also in a better position to enter an
ALMP-program.
For females to a large extent the estimation results are similar to those of the males.
Unobserved heterogeneity is important for females as well. After accounting for this
selectivity the size of the treatment effect for females is about the same as it is for males.
The difference between the two mass points of the transition rate to a job is about the same,
as is the difference between the two mass point of the transition to an ALMP program and
the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity.  Therefore, also for females selectivity is a
very important phenomenon we have to account for in order to get unbiased estimates of
the treatment effect. It appears that married females and Hungarian females have no
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different job finding rate than their counterparts have. Finally, female Gypsies and
Hungarians have a smaller transition rate to ALMP-programs.
We also investigated whether conditional on the other observed characteristics there is a
differences between the transition rates for males and females. It turns out that there are no
difference in transition rate into ALMP-programs. However, on average male unemployed
workers do have a higher transition rate from unemployment to a job than female
unemployed workers have.
5.2 Sensitivity analysis
So far, the analysis has its limitations. First, we assume that the effect of ALMP is
instantaneous and everlasting. In other words, we do not allow for duration dependence of
the treatment effect. Second, we do not distinguish between different types of treatment
effects. In particular we do not distinguish between SPJ, PUJ and retraining. Third, we
assume that the differences between districts are sufficiently covered by the district
unemployment rate. However, it could be that other determinants are relevant as well. In
this section we present the results of sensitivity analyses that address each of these
limitations. Each alternative model is an adapted version of Model 2.
In Model 3 we investigate whether the treatment effect is constant over the duration of the
stay in an ALMP-program. It could be that unemployed workers stay some sort of
minimum time in a program so that the exit rate to a regular job is zero during the initial
period and positive afterwards. Then, the size of the treatment effect increases of the
duration of the treatment. Or, it could be that workers get stigmatized if they stay in a
program too long so that the exit rate to a regular job, and thus the treatment effect
decreases over time. We investigate the possibility of duration dependence in the treatment
effect by allowing the effect of the ALMP-program to change over time:
δ(t) = δ1 . d<6(t)+ δ2.(1-d<6(t)) (10)
where d<6 is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if the duration of stay in the ALMP-
program is less than 6 months. So, we allow the effect of the ALMP-program to be
different after 6 months. The estimation results of Model 3 are shown in Table 4a for  males
and Table 4b for females.
<< Table 4 about here>>
From a likelihood ratio test on the estimation results of Models 2 and 3 it appears that both
for males and females we cannot reject the hypothesis that the treatment effect changes
over the duration of the stay in the ALMP-program. However, the estimated size of the
treatment effect hardly differs between the two time periods. For males the effect is
somewhat smaller after 6 months, for females there is a slight increase. Note that the other
coefficients of Model 3 are virtually the same as those of Model 2. Therefore, we conclude
that duration dependence of the treatment effect is hardly relevant.
In Model 4 we allow for differences between types of ALMP-program. In theory the
transition rates to each of the different types of program may differ in all of its components.
That is, it may be that the effect of observed characteristics, duration dependence and
unobserved characteristics is destination specific. Furthermore, the structure of correlations
between the different unobserved components can be quite complex. We leave this
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extensive analysis of differences between ALMP programs for future research. Here, we
assume that the only difference between the distinguished destinations concerns the size of
the treatment effect:
δ = δspj . dspj+ δpuj . dpuj + δtrain . dtrain (11)
where dspj is a dummy variable with the value with of one if the treatment consists of an
SPJ, dpuj is a dummy variable with the value with of one if the treatment consists of an PUJ
and dtrain is a dummy variable with the value with of one if the treatment consists of
retraining. The second columns of Tables 5a and 5b show the estimation results. First note
that for males the coefficients of the observed characteristics, of the duration dependence
and of unobserved heterogeneity are hardly affected by the distinction in type of treatment.
This indicates that as a first approximation the assumptions underlying Model 4 are not that
bad. Second, and most important it turns out that the size of the treatment effect is very
much dependent on the type of treatment. While the effect of training and publicly useful
jobs is positive, the effect of socially purposeful jobs is negative. For females we find that
the introduction of destination specific treatment effects influences both the duration
dependence of the job finding rate and the mixing distribution. This indicates that the timing
of events may be different for different destinations. Nevertheless, also for females we find
that the effect of retraining is most positive and the effect of SPJ is most negative.
Comparing the results of males and females we see that the absolute size of the treatment
effect is smaller for females than it is for males.
In Model 5 we use fixed effects for each of the districts in our sample. This means that we
have to omit the district unemployment rate as explanatory variable since this variable only
has cross-sectional variation. With a few exceptions we find that the introduction of fixed
district effects does not influence our estimation results. One of the exceptions is the effect
of being Hungarian on the transition rate to a regular job. This negative effect disappears
after the introduction of the fixed effects which is an indication that differences between
districts are relevant here. For females we hardly find any differences after the introduction
of the district fixed effects. The overall estimation results as measured by the value of the
loglikelihood improve substantially when district fixed effects are introduced. This indicates
that the district unemployment rate only partly covers relevant differences between districts.
However, the estimated coefficients and especially the estimated treatment effect hardly
change.
6.  CONCLUSIONS
The system of active labor market policies in the Slovak Republic consists to a large extent
of the creation of socially purposeful and publicly useful jobs and of retraining of
unemployed workers. ALMP-jobs are intended for unemployed workers to get them out of
unemployment, give them additional work experience and get them to find a regular job
more easily. Retraining activities are intended to improve and adapt the skills of
unemployed workers. So far, the effects of these types of active labor market policies have
hardly been investigated. This paper attempts to measure these effects. We use data from
various administrative files to describe the outflow from unemployment into regular jobs
and into ALMP-programs, and the outflow from these programs to regular jobs. We
investigate to what extent it is beneficial for unemployed workers who want a regular job to
accept a temporary ALMP-job or enter a retraining program.
14
The main issue in an evaluation study of this kind is the possible endogeneity of the inflow
into the treatment program. It could be that unemployed workers that flow into an ALMP-
program have unobserved characteristics that are different from those that do not. If for
example ALMP-participants are less able to find a regular job than otherwise identical non-
ALMP participants, then a straightforward comparison of the two groups in terms of
transition rates to regular jobs would lead to an underestimation of the effect of an ALMP-
program. To account for this type of selectivity we estimate transition rate models that
allow both rates to be interdependent.
Our estimation results indicate that female, lower educated and older unemployed workers
have a worse labor market position, both in terms of the speed with which they find regular
jobs as in terms of the speed with which they enter ALMP-programs. The latter type of jobs
is indeed especially for long term unemployed. One of the striking results of our analysis is
that there are hardly any variables that discriminate between the two exit states. It seems the
case that those workers who have a better position when it comes to finding regular jobs
are also in a better position to find SPJ or PUJ. The jobs created by active labor market
policies seem to be complementary to the regular labor market rather than compensating
for bad labor market characteristics.
It turns out that unobserved heterogeneity and therefore selectivity is important in the
transition processes. For both males and females there are two groups of apparently
identical individuals that have different transition rates to both regular jobs and ALMP-
programs. There is one group of workers of about 10% that has a low transition rate to a
regular job and a high transition rate to an ALMP-program. Another group of unemployed
workers of about 90% has a higher transition rate to a regular job and a low transition rate
to an ALMP-program. Selectivity in the transition to ALMP-programs does appear to be a
very important phenomenon. For both males and females we find that if we do not account
for selectivity we get a negative treatment effect of ALMP-programs. Then, we would
erroneously conclude that entering an ALMP-program stigmatizes individuals. If we
account for selectivity in the inflow into ALMP-programs we find that workers that enter
these programs benefit from it. After entering an ALMP-program the exit rate to a regular
job increases with 150%. From an additional sensitivity analysis we conclude that this effect
is mainly due to the positive effect of retraining and publicly useful jobs. For socially
purposeful jobs we find a negative effect on the transition rate from unemployment to a job.
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Appendix 1- Definition and means of variables
All variables are dummy variables (with value 1 where indicated and value 0 for the reference
group)
Definitions of variables
Age<30: age is below 30 years as measured in 1998
Reference group age: age is 30 years or more in 1998
Incomplete secondary education
Secondary and higher education (including university)
Reference group education: no education - basic education – apprentice
Married: married or cohabiting person
Reference group marital status: single-divorced – widow/widower - unknown
Gypsies
Hungarians
Reference group ability: others
Urate: natural logarithm of the average district unemployment rate in 1992
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Appendix 2- Descriptive characteristics of the 1993 inflow sample from the 20 Slovak districts
Means of variables Males Females
(Number of observations) (6651) (4970)
Age < 30 0.38 0.36
Age ≥ 30 0.62 0.64
Lower education 0.49 0.42
Incomplete secondary educ 0.23 0.15
Secondary and higher educ 0.28 0.43
Married 0.51 0.64
Other marital status 0.49 0.36
Gypsies  0.04 0.03
Hungarians 0.05 0.05
Others 0.91 0.92









Main characteristics of the sampled districts and comparison with Slovak totals
Area Population Econ. active Population Unempl.
population density rate
[ sq. km] [ ths. ]  [ ths. ] [pers./sq.km] [ % ]
SLOVAK TOTAL 49034 5379 48,4 109 13,44
SAMPLE: Area Population Share of Population Unempl.
20 DISTRICTS econ. active density rate
Reg. [ sq. km] [ ths. ] population [pers./sq.km] [ % ]
Bratislava 1 BA 10 48 46,4% 4918 3,85
Bratislava 5 BA 94 130 57,2% 1381 4,08
Pezinok BA 375 53 49,1% 142 5,39
Prievidza TN 960 141 47,9% 147 10,67
Trencin TN 675 114 47,4% 168 4,79
Nitra NR 871 163 50,4% 187 10,00
Nove Zamky NR 1347 152 48,7% 113 17,33
Cadca ZA 760 92 43,7% 121 14,09
Dolny Kubin ZA 490 39 44,2% 79 12,91
Martin ZA 736 98 53,3% 133 9,76
Zilina ZA 815 156 49,1% 192 9,11
Banska Bystrica BB 809 113 52,4% 140 6,07
Rimavska Sobota BB 1471 82 45,9% 56 29,83
Bardejov PO 937 75 47,4% 80 19,26
Poprad PO 1123 102 47,0% 91 15,54
Presov PO 934 159 46,2% 170 15,40
Vranov n. Toplou PO 769 74 39,0% 97 23,87
Michalovce KE 1109 108 44,6% 97 20,00
Roznava KE 1173 61 53,7% 52 21,35
Spisska N. Ves KE 587 90 48,2% 153 19,92
TOTAL  SAMPLE 16045 2050 48% 426 13,66
Share of Slovak total 33% 38%
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Table 2
ALMP - subsidized job creation in the sampled districts (as % of Slovak total)
SPJ inflow PUJ inflow
1993 1994 1995 1993 1994 1995
SR total jobs 35 945 38 983 46 866 13 331 16 084 44 342
of which %
Bratislava 1 a 4,6 0,0 3,5 0,8 1,0 1,3
Bratislava 5 a 4,6 0,0 3,5 0,8 1,0 1,3
Pezinok b - - - - - -
Prievidza 1,0 2,4 3,0 3,0 3,3 3,8
Trencin 5,2 1,8 1,7 6,3 3,9 1,8
Nitra 4,6 3,8 2,3 0,1 2,1 3,0
Nove Zamky 5,1 2,9 2,2 3,2 3,5 4,1
Cadca 3,3 6,6 1,8 6,1 1,7 1,8
Dolny Kubin 1,8 2,2 2,0 4,6 5,9 3,2
Martin 1,3 1,8 1,7 1,2 0,9 1,8
Zilina 1,8 1,3 2,1 2,3 1,9 1,5
Banska Bystrica 2,7 0,2 1,6 1,4 2,4 1,9
Rimavska Sobota 2,0 2,3 5,0 1,9 2,1 5,7
Bardejov 1,8 2,1 1,8 3,3 3,6 3,0
Poprad 1,9 3,7 3,3 1,9 4,1 3,9
Presov 5,7 8,2 3,5 5,9 3,3 2,9
Vranov nad Toplou 1,1 2,2 1,6 1,8 2,0 2,7
Michalovce 2,9 3,6 2,6 1,7 3,9 2,1
Roznava 2,0 2,3 2,9 1,8 2,7 2,7
Spisska N. Ves 2,3 2,9 4,7 1,8 4,2 3,7
Source: Ministry of Labor, Social Affairs and Family of SR
a Totals  for Bratislava
b The district did not exist before 1997
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Table 3
Estimation results: hazard rates to regular jobs and to ALMP-jobs and training (t-values in
parentheses)
MALES FEMALES
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Regular job
Age <30  0.12 (3.0)*  0.12 (2.6)*  0.05 (0.9)  0.10 (1.8)
Incomplete Sec. education  0.07 (1.6)  0.14 (2.9)*  0.03 (0.4)  0.06 (0.9)
Secondary and higher educ.  0.04 (1.0)  0.02 (0.3) -0.02 (0.5) -0.06 (1.1)
Married  0.31 (8.0)*  0.33 (7.8)* -0.07 (1.5) -0.07 (1.3)
Gypsy -0.61 (5.9)* -0.70 (6.5)* -0.68 (4.9)* -0.71 (5.1)*
Hungarian -0.24 (2.7)* -0.26 (2.7)* -0.17 (1.7) -0.10 (0.9)
Urate/10 -0.12 (2.6)* -0.11 (2.1)* -0.19 (3.2)* -0.21 (3.2)*
Mass points
ua -2.81 (38.9)* -2.73 (33.2)* -2.77 (30.2)* -2.69(26.9)*
ub       - -6.45 (24.1)*      - -5.70(15.7)*
Duration dependence
3-4 Quarters -0.37 (7.7)* -0.36 (7.4)* -0.20 (3.6)* -0.21 (3.8)*
4-8 Quarters -0.48 (9.5)* -0.49 (9.3)* -0.41 (6.8)* -0.45 (7.5)*
8+ Quarters -0.44 (7.4)* -0.21 (3.1)* -0.79 (10.3)* -0.61 (7.9)*
ALMP-job & training
Age <30  0.06 (0.6)  0.07 (0.6)  0.18 (1.4)  0.18 (1.2)
Incomplete Sec. education  0.22 (1.9)  0.24 (1.7)  0.50 (2.9)*  0.65 (3.9)*
Secondary and higher educ.  0.27 (2.5)*  0.47 (3.7)*  0.96 (6.8)*  1.17 (8.4)*
Married -0.06 (0.6) -0.11 (0.9)  0.01 (0.1)  0.05 (0.3)
Gypsy -0.40 (2.2)* -0.14 (0.6) -0.98 (2.9)* -1.08 (2.7)*
Hungarian -0.36 (1.8) -0.25 (1.0) -0.50 (1.9)* -0.80 (2.5)*
Urate/10  0.28 (2.5)*  0.34 (2.7)* -0.07 (0.6)  0.00 (0.0)
Mass points
va -5.77 (29.0)* -6.52 (27.0)* -6.13 (24.5)* -6.99(20.7)*
vb      - -4.34 (17.6)*      - -4.56(14.0)*
Duration dependence
3-4 Quarters  0.27 (1.9)  0.19 (1.3)  0.74 (4.6)*  0.75 (4.6)*
4-8 Quarters  0.97 (8.1)*  0.86 (6.7)*  1.19 (7.9)*  1.27 (7.5)*
8+ Quarters  1.52 (12.1)*  1.51 (9.2)*  1.80 (11.9)*  2.17(10.8)*
Treatment effect
Average (δ) -1.43 (22.3)*  0.92 (7.2)*  -0.95 (11.7)*  0.86 (6.2)*
Unobs. het. probability
α     -  2.17 (18.5)*       -  2.50(14.6)*
Loglikelihood -16678.5 -16522.8 -11855.5 -11777.1
* = significantly different from zero at 5%-level of significance
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Table 4a
Estimation results; sensitivity analysis males (t-values in parentheses)
Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Regular job
Age <30  0.12 (2.6)*  0.12 (2.6)*  0.10 (2.3)*
Incomplete Sec. education  0.14 (2.9)*  0.14 (2.7)*  0.24 (4.6)* 
Secondary and higher educ.  0.02 (0.4)  0.03 (0.7)  0.08 (1.8) 
Married  0.34 (7.8)*  0.36 (8.0)*  0.30 (7.1)*
Gypsy -0.70 (6.5)* -0.77 (6.9)* -0.58 (5.3)*
Hungarian -0.26 (2.7)* -0.29 (2.9)* -0.12 (1.1)
Urate/10 -0.11 (2.0)* -0.10 (1.8)      -
Mass points
ua -2.73 (32.9)* -2.71 (31.4)* -2.95 (15.3)*
ub -6.13 (17.8)* -5.33 (19.8)* -6.49 (21.1)*
Duration dependence
3-4 Quarters -0.35 (7.3)* -0.33 (6.9)* -0.33 (7.0)* 
4-8 Quarters -0.48 (9.2)* -0.43 (7.8)* -0.46 (8.8)*
8+ Quarters -0.19 (2.8)* -0.05 (0.6) -0.22 (3.7)*
ALMP-job & training
Age <30  0.06 (0.5)  0.08 (0.7)  0.11 (0.8)
Incomplete Sec. education  0.23 (1.6)  0.20 (1.5)  0.04 (0.2) 
Secondary and higher educ.  0.44 (3.5)*  0.30 (2.6)*  0.46 (3.4)* 
Married -0.11 (1.0) -0.13 (1.2) -0.05 (0.4)
Gypsy -0.15 (0.6) -0.11 (0.5) -0.47 (1.8)
Hungarian -0.25 (1.0) -0.20 (0.9) -0.18 (0.6)
Urate/10  0.34 (2.7)*  0.34 (2.8)*       -
Mass points
va -6.49 (26.6)* -6.40 (26.3)* -5.87 (10.6)*
vb -4.40 (17.6)* -4.70 (19.2)* -3.19 (5.8)*
Duration dependence
3-4 Quarters  0.18 (1.3)  0.16 (1.1)  0.24 (1.6) 
4-8 Quarters  0.85 (6.7)*  0.79 (6.4)*  1.03 (7.1)*
8+ Quarters  1.47 (9.1)*  1.24 (9.1)*  1.88 (10.6)*
Treatment effect
Average (δ)      -     -  0.84 (6.5)*
< 6 months (δ1)   0.94 (6.6)*     -      -
> 6 months (δ2)   0.58 (1.9)     -      -
SPJ      - -0.36 (1.6)      -
PUJ      -  0.85 (3.6)*      -
Retraining      -  2.57 (8.4)*      -
Unobs. het. probability
α   2.14 (16.3)*  1.72 (12.0)*  2.30 (22.5)*
Fixed district effects     no     no    yes
Loglikelihood -16520.4 -16473.8 -16382.9
* = significantly different from zero at 5%-level of significance
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Table 4b
Estimation results; sensitivity analysis females (t-values in parentheses)
Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Regular job
Age <30  0.10 (1.8)  0.06 (0.9)  0.10 (1.8)
Incomplete Sec. education  0.06 (0.9)  0.03 (0.3)  0.08 (1.1) 
Secondary and higher educ. -0.06 (0.1) -0.12 (1.9) -0.04 (0.8) 
Married -0.07 (1.3) -0.11 (1.6) -0.09 (1.5)
Gypsy -0.71 (5.1)* -0.95 (5.3)* -0.69 (4.8)*
Hungarian -0.10 (0.9) -0.22 (1.6) -0.01 (0.1)
Urate/10 -0.20 (3.2)* -0.21 (2.6)*      -
Mass points
ua -2.70 (27.0)* -1.85 (9.3)* -3.14 (15.1)*
ub -5.80 (14.7)* -3.71 (14.2)* -6.13 (17.0)*
Duration dependence
3-4 Quarters -0.20 (3.6)*  0.00 (0.1) -0.19 (3.4)* 
4-8 Quarters -0.46 (7.6)*  0.04 (0.3) -0.43 (7.0)*
8+ Quarters -0.62 (7.9)*  0.19 (0.9) -0.60 (7.5)*
ALMP-job & training
Age <30  0.18 (1.2)  0.19 (1.4)  0.28 (1.7)
Incomplete Sec. education  0.65 (3.2)*  0.50 (2.9)*  0.53 (2.4)* 
Secondary and higher educ.  1.16 (8.1)*  0.98 (8.5)*  1.19 (7.5)* 
Married  0.04 (0.3)  0.03 (0.2)  0.15 (0.9)
Gypsy -1.07 (2.7)* -0.90 (2.6)* -1.24 (2.9)*
Hungarian -0.79 (2.5)* -0.47 (1.8) -1.09 (3.4)*
Urate/10 -0.00 (0.0)  0.05 (0.4)       -
Mass points
va -6.97 (21.3)* -7.09 (8.5)* -6.28 (13.9)*
vb -4.56 (14.0)* -5.93 (21.0)* -3.79 (8.6)*
Duration dependence
3-4 Quarters  0.75 (4.6)*  0.65 (3.9)*  0.78 (4.5)* 
4-8 Quarters  1.27 (7.6)*  1.03 (5.9)*  1.34 (7.4)*
8+ Quarters  2.15 (11.0)*  1.57 (7.8)*  2.20 (10.2)*
Treatment effect
Average (δ)     -     -  0.90 (6.2)*
< 6 months (δ1)  0.85 (5.8)*     -      -
> 6 months (δ2)  0.95 (4.2)*     -      -
SPJ      - -1.43 (5.8)*      -
PUJ      -  0.50 (1.6)      -
Retraining      -  1.81 (7.3)*      -
Unobs. het. probability
α  2.52 (14.9)*  -0.47 (1.4)  2.29 (15.1)*
Fixed district effects     no     no    yes
Loglikelihood -11772.6 -11733.9 -11679.3
* = significantly different from zero at 5%-level of significance
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List of the selected districts:
BA Bratislava 1 MT Martin
BA Bratislava 5 BB Banska Bystrica
PK Pezinok RS Rimavska Sobota
TN Trencin BJ Bardejov
PD Prievidza PP Poprad
NR Nitra PO Presov
NZ Nove Zamky VT Vranov nad Toplou
CA Cadca MI Michalovce
ZA Zilina SN Spisska Nova Ves
DK Dolny Kubin RV Roznava
